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March 22, 1985 Conference 
List 1, Sheet 3 
No. 84-1273 
REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY 
OF MICHIGAN 
v. 
EWING (dismissed medical 
student) 
Cert to CA6 (Keith, Peck, Neese 
[SDJ] ) 
Federal/Civil Timely 
SUMMARY: Petr contends that the CA6 erred in holding that 
resp's substantive due process rights were violated when he was 
dismissed from the University's medical school because of poor 
academic performance. 
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FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW: In 1975, resp entered the 
Interflex program at the Medical School of the University of 
Michigan. Under this program, recent high-school graduates may 
obtain a M.D. degree in only 6 years. Resp's performance at the 
school was characterized by repeated shortcomings and academic 
deficiencies. For instance, he required 6 years to complete the 
course work that is usually performed in 4. Three times resp was 
placed on academic probabation and warned that further problems 
could cause his dismissal. 
While on probabtion in June 1981, resp sat for Part I of a 
standardized test written by the National Board of Medical 
Examiners (NBME Part I). This two-day test covers basic science 
and includes questions on anatomy, biochemistry, microbiology, and 
the like. A medical student must pass this exam before he is 
allowed to enter the clinical phase of his education. 
Resp failed 5 of the 7 subjects on the test. His total score 
was 235, well below the -minimum passing grade of 345. It seems 
that the national mean is 500 and resp's score of 235 was "the 
lowest score ever recorded by a University of Michigan student." 
DC Opin., Pet. for Cert. 15a. 
Pursuant to ususal practice, resp's failure on the NBME Part I 
was brought before the Interflex Promotion and Review Board, a 
committee of 15 faculty members and course directors who pass upon 
a student's qualifications. The board, after reviewing resp's 
academic history, voted unanimously to drop resp from the program. 
Resp petitioned the board to reconsider, and thus a hearing was 
It scheduled for July 31, 1981. Resp explained that personal 
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problems, such as a lack of maturity, led to his academic 
difficulties. The board considered resp's explanations and voted 
unanimously to affirm its earlier decision. And the Medical 
School's 6-member Executive Committee, after holding another 
hearing, unanimously affirmed resp's dismissal. 
Resp then filed a 4-count complaint in federal court (E.D. 
Mich; J. Feikens). He alleged that he had been dismissed from the 
Medical School in violation of his right to substantive due 
process, which is actionable under 42 u.s.c. §1983. He also 
asserted breach of contract and promissory estoppel claims. After 
a bench trial, the DC ruled against resp on all counts. The DC 
found that the decision to dismiss resp was based on academic 
grounds, and was "not influenced by ill will or ulterior purposes." 
Pet. for Cert. 25a. The court held, therefore, that resp's 
dismissal was "in accord with substantive due process." Id. 1 
The CA6 reversed. The court began from a procedural due 
process perspective and noted that resp had a "property interest" 
in not being arbitrarily dismissed from the medical school. The 
court then considered substantive contraints on public schools and 
cited Stevens v. Hunt, 646 F.2d 1168 (CA6 1981) for the proposition 
that a student at a public institution has a substantive 
constitutional right (due process) not to be dismissed arbitrarily 
or capriciously. 
Applying this rule of constitutional law, the court noted the 
1The DC also ruled against resp on his state-law claims. 
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consistent practice of the University of Michigan to allow medical 
students two chances to pass the NBME Part I. Between 1975 and 
1982, 40 medical students failed the exam and every one of these 
students, except resp, was given a second chance. Accordingly, 
"the action of the University of Michigan was arbitrary and 
capricious and must be reversed." Pet. for Cert. 33a. As a 
remedy, the CA6 ordered the University to allow resp to retake the 
test; because only current students may sit for the exam, this 
means that resp must be readmitted. And the CA6 also directed the 
DC to order the University to allow resp to continue in the 
Interflex program if he passes the test. 
CONTENTIONS : Petr first maintains that the Eleventh 
Amendment bars the CA6's remedy. Petr is a state agency (i.e., the 
State) and Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 104 S. 
Ct. 900 (1984), teaches that "a suit against a State is barred 
regardless of whether it seeks damages or injunctive relief." Id., 
at 909. The exception of Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), 
which allows injunctive suits for unconstitutional acts, does not 
apply because resp's complaint did not list individuals as 
defendants. 
Petr primarily seeks review of the CA6's decision that the 
Constitution creates sub~ntive limits on a medical school's 
decision to dismiss a student on academic grounds. Petr quotes 
from Board of Curators of the University of Missouri v. Horowitz, 
435 U.S. 78 (1978), where the Court noted that "a number of lower 
courts have implied in dictum that academic dismissals from state 
institutions can be enjoined if 'shown to be clearly arbitrary or 
• 
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capricious.'" Id., at 91 {citing cases). The Court neither 
accepted nor repudiated those decisions, and since then the lower 
courts have acted aimlessly. Two district courts have declined to 
perform substantive judicial review. See Lavish v. Kountze, 472 F. 
Supp. 868, 872 {D. Mass. 1979) {"judicial intrusion into ••• 
academic area is not warranted"); Hubbard v. John ~yler Community 
College, 455 F. Supp. 753, 756 {"substantive due process right does 
not involve a review of ~ademic decisions"); contra Bleicker v. 
Board of Trustees of the Ohio State University, 485 F. Supp. 1381, 
1387 {S.D. Ohio 1980) {Horowitz approved lower court dicta that 
academic dismissals may be enjoined upon showing that they are 
arbitrary and capricious). In Hines v. Rinker, 667 F.2d 699 
{1981), the Eighth Circuit avoided the question by holding that, 
regardless whether such judicial review is mandated, no arbitrary 
or capricious conduct was demonstrated. And the CA6 stands alone 
in ordering a university to readmit someone who was dismissed on 
academic grounds. 
As one might expect, petr also challenges the wisdom of judges 
making decisions about who is qualified to remain in medical 
school. According to petr, the CA6 "did not even allude to the 
unanimous decisions of those best trained and qualified to assess 
resp's qualifications, or to the numerous academic factors on which 
their decision to dismiss was based." Pet. for Cert. 22. 
Resp notes that Pennhurst does not preclude injunctive relief 
against state officials who violate federal law. Perhaps resp 
should have named the individual members of the Board of Regents; 
however, as the Court held recently in Brandon v. Holt, {Jan. 21, 
• 
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1985), this pleading defect may be remedied under Fed. R. Civ. P. 
15. In any event, resp has waived this argument. For example, in 
its Brief in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for a Preliminary 
Injunction, petr stated that "the only relief which plaintiff can 
obtain if he is successful is equitable." 
Resp asserts that there is no conflict in the circuits over 
the question whether an arbitrary and capricious dismissal violates 
the Constitution: no circuit has declined to afford such limited 
judicial review. Morevoer, the "arbitrary and capricious" standard 
is appropriately deferential, but any less stringent rule "would 
place school officials beyond the law's reach." Br. in Opp. 23. 
And applying this standard here, the CAG did not err: since 1975 
resp is the only Michigan student not allowed a second chance to 
pass the NMBE Part I. 
DISCUSSION: In light of Ex parte Young, Brandon v. Holt, and 
petr's concessions that equitable relief was available, petr's 
Eleventh Amendment claim should not interest the Court. However, 
petr's other question -- whether the Due Process Clause imposes 
substantive constraints on a public school's decision to dismiss a .... 
student for academic reasons -- is substantial. 2 
To be sure, petr has not identified a clear circuit conflict. 
But as noted above, several district courts have rejected 
invitations to decide whether a student's dismissal for poor 
2This case does not concern a dismissal based on racial or 
some other impermissible ground. It only raises the issue 
whether a decision motivated by academic reasons is 
unconstitutional if arbitrary or capricious. 
• 
• 
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academic performance was justified. And circuit courts have 
declined to review substantively a public school's decision not to 
award tenure. See, e.g., Clark v. Whiting, 607 F.2d 634, 640 (CA4 
1979). Thus, although there is no sharp conflict, the CA6's 
decision does seem out of step. 
On the merits, the CA6's judgment is very hard to defend. The 
Court in Horowitz left open the substantive due process question, 
but did not hide its view. The Court remarked: 
"Courts are particularly ill-equipped to evaluate academic 
performance. The factors discussed [above] with respect to 
procedural due process speak a fortiori here and warn 
against any such judicial intrusion into academic 
decisionmaking." 435 U.S., at 92 (emphasis added). 
Without any textual base, however, the CA6 read an Administrative 
Procedure Act into the 14th Amendment. And public universities in 
the Sixth Circuit must now be prepared to satisfy federal judges 
that their academic dismissals are justified. The questionable 
importance of this case makes it a close call, but I recommend a 
"grant." 
There is a response. 
March 9, 1985 Martin 
(c.~) 
Opn in petn 
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No. 84-1273, Regents of the University of Michigan v. Ewing (CA 6) 
Memorandum to File: 
This is a case of vast importance to the institutions of higher 
learning of our country. It can be argued also that the case is 
important to students who may have cause for believing that their 
dismissal from a college or university was arbitrary and capricious. 
The facts are summarized in detail in the brief of the University 
of Michigan (the University), as well as the opinions of the courts 
below and other briefs. The SG has filed an amicus brief urging 
reversal of CA 6, and I think its factual summary is entirely 
adequate. 
Respondent is a former student at the University who alleges 
that his dismissal for substandard academic performance violated 
substantive due process. The University has a special "Inteflex" 
six-year program that combines both undergraduate and medical 
courses in a rigorous six-year curriculum. Respondent enrolled 
in this program in the fall of 1975. Inteflex students, since 
they are in this special course, are graded and evaluated 
separately from students who take other types of programs in 
the Medical School - including the standard four-year MD program. 
The Inteflex program consists of three two-year phases, each of 
which a student must complete satisfactorily before being allowed 
- -
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to move to the next phase and to graduate. Respondent was in 
trouble his first semester, and continued to be in trouble 
until finally he was dismissed. See the briefs for details. 
As a result of various deficiencies, and of leaving the University 
for a period, he finally concluded the first two phases (normally 
done in four years) in six years. Before the University permitted 
students in this program to begin the final two-year clinical phase, 
the student is required to pass Part I of the National Board of 
Medical Examiners Test, a two day multiple choice examination. 
Respondent not only flunked this test; he received the lowest 
score ever recorded by a University of Michigan student. 
The Medical School's Promotion and Review Board voted 
unanimously to dismiss respondent from the program. After 
granting respondent's request for reconsideration, the Board 
held a hearing, heard respondent's various reasons for his poor 
performance (Seen. 2, p. 3 of the SG's brief}, the Board again 
voted unanimously to dismiss him. In the course of this hearing, 
respondent admitted that he had received and understood a letter 
advising him that he was on probation and could be dismissed for 
further deficiencies. Respondent next appealed to the medical 
school's Executive Committee. After meeting with respondent, 
that committee also unanimously affirmed his dismissal. Respondent 
then filed this suit in the DC seeking injunctive relief and 
- -
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damages under §1983. He also alleged a state law breach of 
contract and promissory estoppel claims. Respondent did not 
claim that he had been denied procedural due process. Rather, 
he alleged that he had a "property interest" in his status as 
a medical school student, and had been denied substantive due 
process in an arbitrary and capricious manner when he was not 
permitted to retake the exam he flunked so badly. He attached 
~ -~<..h 
primary ~......,...,...= n the conceded fact that the University had 
~ 
allowed every other student - a total of 40 - who had failed 
this test to take it again. 
After a four day bench trial, the DC ruled against respondent 
on all counts. It noted that in Board of Curators of the University 
of Missouri v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, this Court had left open the 
question "whether courts can review academic qualification decisions 
on substantive due process grounds". The DC concluded that academic 
dismissals are not subject to substantive due process review. 
- ...... \...-.-= ----- ~ _., 
The DC noted the statement in Horowitz that judges are "ill-equipped 
to evaluate academic performance." Id. at 92. The DC also 
dismissed respondent's breach of contract and promissory estoppel 
claims, finding no factual basis for either one. 
The Court of Appeals reversed. It relied to some extent 
on Roth and Sindermann although these cases involved procedural 
due process only. Relying on a Michigan decision in 1909, CA 6 
- -
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-lk/-a,,-,~~ 
concluded that under state law "an implied understanding shall 
""' not be arbitrarily dismissed from his University is a property 
interest, resting in the contractual relationship between the -------
parties, which can give rise to constitutional protections." 
Finally, CA 6 concluded that the University acted "in an 
arbitrary and capricious manner by not allowing respondent a 
second opportunity" to take the NBME test. 
The University's Arguments 
Its first argument is that a suit against the Regents of 
the University of Michigan is against the state itself, and ....... 
therefore is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. It is argued 
that CA 6's injunction order with respect to retaking the 
examination conflicts directly with our decision in Pennhurst v. 
Halderman. Although, as I dictate this, I do not recall whether 
the courts below addressed this Eleventh Amendment claim, it was 
raised by the state as an affirmative defense and was not waived. 
Respondent is a California citizen. The University therefore 
argues that the Eleventh Amendment bars a citizen of one state 
from bringing suit in federal court against another state for 
both damages and equitable relief. Reliance is placed on the 
statement in Pennhurst as follows: 
- -
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"When the State itself is named as the 
defendant, a suit against state officials 
that is in fact a suit against a state is 
barred regardless of whether it seeks 
damages or injunctive relief." Pennhurst, 
104, S.Ct. at 909 (1984) 
I must reread Pennhurst (despite having worked on it 
during two different Terms!), but I believe that the Eleventh 
Amendment does bar injunctive relief against the state itself 
~ • _, A '8' f...61 7'· < Kc:: C 




indicated in Edelman v. Jordan. This is an exception to 
~ ,,,, .e le~ t..... ~~J:i.u-t 
parte Young. Whatever the ~ecisi6ns hold, it is clear to 
'\ 
that permitting federal courts to review academic decisions 
by state universities on substantive due process grounds would 
be a serious intrusion on state sovereignty. But I do not think 
we granted this case to address the state sovereignty issue, 
although if it is a valid defense we would not reach the substantive 
due process issue. I need to do some thinking about this, and will 
want my clerk's views. 
The University's primary argument focuses on the substantive 
due process issue, and the SG only addressed this issue. The 
University's brief argues - perhaps in extreme terms - that the 
decisions below "sounded a shock wave throughout the community 
of Medical Schools in the United States", and that the injunction 
- -
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granted by CA 6 is a "dangerous precedent that threatens all 
Medical School education". Apart from such statements, the 
University properly relies - as I view it - on the academic 
freedom argument that has been mentioned in a number of our 
decisions. See its brief, p. 26 et~ The University's 
brief also states that it is clea.r under Michigan law that an 
individual does not possess a property interest in the practice 
of a particular business or profession, and cites a number of 
cases. Seep. 39. 
I find the SG's argument - much briefer than that of the 
University - to be more persuasive. Dismissal for academic 
deficiencies should not be viewed as violating substantive 
due process rights. Even if there were under Michigan law a 
contract between the University and respondent, this should not 
. give rise to a substantive due process federal claim against 
the University. Of course there is procedural due process 
protection - a protection not created by the constitution but 
derived rather from independent sources such as state law. 
Board of Regents v. Roth. Substantive due process rights, in 
contrast, are created by the constitution itself. At most, 
respondent's claim is nothing more than that the University 
breached its contract with him. 
- -
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The SG finally addresses the holding of CA 6 that the 
University acted arbitrarily and capriciously. Although I do 
not believe the SG is explicit, l believe he would not concede 
that even if it were arbitrary and capricious ~ a constitutional 
claim in federal court would arise. In any event, the SG argues 
that CA 6 clearly erred in concluding that the University had 
acted arbitrarily and capriciously in dismissing this respondent 
from medical school. Although I hesitate to express more than a 
tentative view at this stage of my consideration of a case, I 
agree with the SG on this argument. If there ever was a student 
who deserved to be dismissed, respondent's dismal record almost 
speaks for itself. There is no evidence that any of the other 
40 students who were given the opportunity to retake the exam had 
a record at all comparable to that of respondent. It also seems 
to me that the University abundantly provided procedural due 
process in the care with which its decision was reached and 
administratively reviewed. 
Finally, as perhaps could be anticipated from what I wrote 
in Bakke, I think - as Justice Frankfurter did - that academic 
freedom is a special concern of the First A.mendrnent. See 
Keyishain v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603, and Bakke, 
438 U.S. 265, 312; and Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263. 
- -
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Arguments of Respondent 
His arguments are interestingly stated in the "summary of 
argument" in his brief, p. 8-10. He "substantially agrees" 
that courts are ill-equipped to set academic standards 
II or otherwise oversee faculty determinations of grades or test 
scores." Nevertheless, respondent contends that the University, 
in effect, had adopted a rule allowing students who flunked this 
Hu.-
particular examination to retake it - citing th-a-t 40 cases in 
which this had been permitted. Therefore, according to respondent, 
a "rule" had been established that was violated arbitrarily and 
capriciously in this case. The essence of respondent's position 
is that fundamental fairness requires federal court review where 
a dismissal decision is found 
I will want ~ emo 
to be "arbitrary and capricious." 
from my clerk. 
XT// 
L. F. P. , Jr. 
- -
December 4, 1985 




to read as follows: 
wit~ our telephone talk, I suggest the 
Amend the last sentence of footnote 6 
"We consequently grant the motion, thereby 
allowing Ewing to name as defendants the in-
dividual members of the Board of Regents in 
their official capacities. See Patsv v. 
Florida Board of Regents, ••• " 
In addition, add a sentence at the end of the footnote 
that reads: 
"Given our resolutio~ of the case, we need 
not consider the question whether the relief 
sought by Ewing would be available under 
Eleventh Amendment principles." 
As the Eleventh Amendment issue concerning the pro-
priety of the relief sought was not clearly raised below and 
not argued here, it seems appropriate to make clear we need 
not reach it. 












From: Justice Powell 
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Recirculated: _________ _ 
1st DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 84-1273 
REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN, 
PETITIONER v. SCOTT E. EWING 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF . 
APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 
[December - , 1985) 
JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
Although I join the Court's opinion holding that respondent 
presents no violation of the substantive due process right 
that he asserts, I think it unnecessary to assume the exist-
ence of such a right on the facts of this case. Respondent 
alleges that he had a property interest in his continued enroll-
ment in the University's Inteflex program, and that his dis-
missal was arbitrary and capricious. The dismissal allegedly 
violated his substantive due process rights guaranteed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment, providing the basis for his claim 
under 42 U. S. C. § 1983. 
I 
As the Court correctly points out, respondent's claim to a 
property right is dubious at best. Ante, at --, n. 7. 
Even if one assumes the existence of a property right, how-
ever, not every such right is entitled to the protection of sub-
stantive due process. While property interests are pro-
tected by procedural due process even though the interest is 
derived from state law rather than the Constitution, Board of 
Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564, 577 (1972), substantive due 
process rights are created only by the Constitution. 
The history of substantive due process "counsels caution 
and restraint." Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 
494, 502 (1976) (opinion of POWELL, J., for a plurality). The 
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judgment that "certain interests require particularly careful 
scrutiny of the state needs asserted to justify their abridg-
ment." Id. , quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S. 497, 543 
(Harlan, J., dissenting). In the context of liberty interests, 
this Court has been careful to examine each asserted interest 
to determine whether it "merits" the protection of substan-
tive due process. See, e. g., City of East Cleveland, supra; 
Roe v. Wade , 410 U. S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 
381 U. S. 479 (1965). "Each new claim to [substantive due 
process] protection must be considered against a background 
of Constitutional purposes, as they have been rationally per-
ceived and historically developed." Poe, supra, at 544 (Har-
lan, J., dissenting). 
The interest asserted by respondent-an interest in contin-
ued enrollment from which he derives a right to retake the 
NBME-is essentially a state law contract right. It bears 
little resemblance to the -fundamental interests that previ-
ously have been viewed as implicitly protected by the Con-
stitution. It certainly is not closely tied to "respect for the 
teachings of history, ·solid recognition of the basic values that 
underlie our society, and wise appreciation of the great roles 
that the doctrines of federalism and separation of powers 
have played in establishing and preserving American free-
doms," Griswold, supra, at 501 (Harlan, J., concurring in the 
judgment). For these reasons, briefly summarized, I do not 
think the fact that Michigan may have labelled this interest 
"property'' ·entitles it to join those other, far more important 
interests that have heretofore been accorded the protection 
of substantive due process. Cf. Harrah Independent School 
District v. Martin, 440 U. S. 194 (1978). 
II 
I agree fully with the Court's emphasis on the respect and 
deference that courts should accord academic decisions made 
by the appropriate university authorities. In view of 
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izes as "unfortunate," this is a case that never should have 
been litigated. After a four-day trial in a District Court, the 
case was reviewed by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Cir-
cuit, and now is the subject of a decision of the United States 
Supreme Court. Judicial review of academic decisions, in-
cluding those with respect to the admission or dismissal of 
students, is rarely appropriate, particularly where orderly 
administrative procedures are followed-as in this case.* 
*See Board of Curators, University of Missouri v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 
78, 96, n. 6 (1978) (opinion of POWELL, J.), cited ante, at--, n. 11. See 
also University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 312 (1978) 
(opinion of POWELL, J.) ("Academic freedom, though not a specifically enu-
merated constitutional right, long has been viewed as a special concern of 
the First Amendment"). See also Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 
u. s. 589, 603 (1967). 
' 
To: The Chief Justice 
A ustice Brennan -
~ 
~ ustice White L ?. t 
Justice Marshall 





From: Justice Stevens 
Circulated: _ ________ _ 
OEC 5 
Recirculated: _ ________ _ 
3rd DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF fflE UNITED STATES 
No. 84-1273 
REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN, 
PETITIONER v. SCOTT E. EWING 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 
[December -, 1985] 
JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Respondent Scott Ewing was dismissed from the Univer-
sity of Michigan after failing an important written examina-
tion. The question presented is whether the University's ac-
tion deprived Ewing of property without due process of law 
because its refusal to allow him to retake the examination 
was an arbitrary departure from the University's past prac-
tice. The Court of Appeals held that his constitutional 
rights were violated. We disagree. 
I 
In the fall of 1975 Ewing enrolled in a special 6-year pro-
gram of study, known as "Inteflex," offered jointly by the 
undergraduate college and the medical school. 1 An under-
graduate degree and a medical degree are awarded upon suc-
cessful completion of the program. In order to qualify for 
the final two years of the Inteflex program, which consist of 
clinical training at hospitals affiliated with the University, 
the student must successfully complete four years of study 
including both premedical courses and courses in the basic 
medical sciences. The student must also pass the "NBME 
Part I"-a 2-day written test administered by the National 
Board of Medical Examiners. 
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In the spring of 1981, after overcoming certain academic 
and personal difficulties, Ewing successfully completed the 
courses prescribed for the first four years of the Inteflex pro-
gram and thereby qualified to take the NBME Part I. Ew-
ing failed five of the seven subjects on that examination, re-
ceiving a total score of 235 when the passing score was 345. 
(A score of 380 is required for state licensure and the national 
mean is 500.) Ewing received the lowest score recorded by 
an Inteflex student in the brief history of that program. 
On July 24, 1981, the Promotion and Review Board individ-
ually reviewed the status of several students in the Inteflex 
program. After considering Ewing's record in some detail, 
the nine members of the Board in attendance voted unani-
mously to drop him from registration in the program. 
In response to a written request from Ewing, the Board 
reconvened a week later to reconsider its decision. Ewing 
appeared personally and explained why he believed that his 
score on the test did not fairly reflect his academic progress 
or potential. 2 After reconsidering the matter, the nine vot-
ing members present unanimously reaffirmed the prior action 
to drop Ewing from registration in the program. 
In August, Ewing appealed the Board's decision to the 
Executive Committee of the Medical School. After giving 
Ewing an opportunity to be heard in person, the Executive 
Committee unanimously approved a motion to deny his ap-
peal for a leave of absence status that would enable him to 
retake Part I of the NBME examination. In the following 
year, Ewing reappeared before the Executive Committee on 
two separate occasions, each time unsuccessfully seeking re-
2 At this and later meetings Ewing excused his NBME Part I failure 
because his mother had suffered a heart attack 18 months before the 
examination; his girlfriend broke up with him about six months before the 
examination; his work on an essay for a contest had taken too much time; 
his make-up examination in pharmacology was administered just before the 
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admission to the medical school. On August 19, 1982, he 
commenced this litigation in the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Michigan. 
II 
Ewing's complaint against the Regents of the University of 
Michigan asserted a right to retake the NBME Part I test on 
three separate theories, two predicated on state law and one 
based on federal law. 3 As a matter of state law, he alleged 
that the University's action constituted a breach of contract 
and was barred by the doctrine of promissory estoppel. As a 
matter of federal law, Ewing alleged that he had a property 
interest in his continued enrollment in the Inteflex program 
and that his dismissal was arbitrary and capricious, violating 
his "substantive due process rights" guaranteed by the Four-
teenth Amendment and entitling him to relief under 42 
U.S. C. § 1983. 
The District Court held a 4-day bench trial at which it took 
evidence on the University's claim that Ewing's dismissal 
was justified as well as on Ewing's allegation that other Uni-
versity of Michigan medical students who had failed the 
NBME Part I had routinely been given a second opportunity 
to take the test. The District Court described Ewing's un-
fortunate academic history in some detail. Its findings, set 
forth in the margin, 4 reveal that Ewing "encountered imme-
3 A fourth count of Ewing's complaint advanced a claim for damages 
under 42 U. S. C. § 1983. The District Court held that the Board of Re-
gents is a state instrumentality immunized from liability for damages 
under the Eleventh Amendment, and dismissed this count of the com-
plaint. Ewing v. Board of Regents, 552 F . Supp. 881 (ED Mich. 1982). 
• "In the fall of 1975, when Ewing enrolled in the program, he encoun-
tered immediate difficulty in handling the work and he did not take the 
final examination in Biology. It was not until the following semester that 
he completed this course and received a C. His performance in his other 
first semester courses was as follows: a C in Chemistry 120, a C in his writ-
ing course, and an incomplete in the Freshman Seminar. In the next se-
mester he took Chemistry 220, a Freshman Seminar, and Psychology 504. 
He was advised at that time that he could not take the Patient Care 
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diate difficulty in handling the work," Ewing v. Board of Re-
gents , 559 F. Supp. 791, 793 (ED Mich. 1983), and that his 
difficulties-in the form of marginally passing grades and a 
number of incompletes and make-up examinations, many ex-
Course, usually given during the fall of an Inteflex student's second year, 
and he was placed on an irregular program. Because of these difficulties, 
at the July 14, 1976 meeting of the Promotion and Review Board he re-
quested a leave of absence, and when this was approved, he left the 
program. 
"During the summer of 1976 while on leave, he took two Physics courses 
at Point Loma College in California. He reentered the Inteflex program 
at the University of Michigan in the winter 1977 term. In that term he 
repeated Chemistry 220 in which he received an A - . In the spring of 
1977, he passed the Introduction to the Patient Care course. 
"In the 1977-78 year, he completed the regular Year II program. But 
then he encountered new difficulty. In the fall of 1978 he received an 
incomplete in Clinical Studies 400, which was converted to a Pass; a B in 
Microbiology 420; and an incomplete in Gross Anatomy 507. The Gross 
Anatomy incomplete was converted to a C - by a make-up examination. 
During the winter of 1979 he received a C - in Genetics 505, a C in Microbi-
ology 520, an E in Microanatomy and General Pathology 506, a B in Cre-
ative Writing, and a Pass in Clinical Studies 410. He appealed the Micro-
anatomy and General Pathology grade, requesting a change from an E to a 
D, and a make-up exam to receive a Pass. His appeal was denied by the 
Grade Appeal Committee, and he was again placed on an irregular pro-
gram; he took only the Clinical Studies 420 course in the spring 1979 
semester. 
"In July 1979, Ewing submitted a request to the Promotion and Review 
Board for an irregular program consisting of a course in Pharmacology in 
the fall and winter 1979-80 and a course in Human Illness and Neurosci-
ence in 1980-81, thus splitting the fourth year into two years. The Board 
denied this request and directed him to take the fourth year curriculum in 
one academic year. He undertook to do so. He removed his deficiency in 
Microanatomy and General Pathology 506 by repeating the course during 
the winter 1980 semester and received a C + . In the spring term of 1980 
he passed Developmental Anatomy with a B - grade, and he received a C 
grade in Neuroscience I 509 after a reexamination. In the fall of 1980, he 
received a passing grade in Neuroscience 609 and Pharmacology 626, and 
in the winter term of 1981, he received a passing grade in Clinical Studies 
510 and a deficiency in Pharmacology 627. He was given a make-up 
examination in this course, and he received a 67. 7 grade. 
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perienced while Ewing was on a reduced course load-per-
sisted throughout the 6-year period in which he was enrolled 
in the Inteflex program. 
Ewing discounted the importance of his own academic 
record by offering evidence that other students with even 
more academic deficiencies were uniformly allowed to retake 
the NBME Part I. See App. 107-111. The statistical evi-
dence indicated that of the 32 standard students in the Medi-
cal School who failed Part I of the NBME since its inception, 
all 32 were permitted to retake the test, 10 were allowed to 
take the test a third time, and 1 a fourth time. Seven stu-
dents in the Inteflex program were allowed to retake the 
test, and one student was allowed to retake it twice. Ewing 
is the only student who, having failed the test, was not per-
mitted to retake it. Dr. Robert Reed, a former . Director of 
the Inteflex program and a member of the Promotion and Re-
view Board, stated that students were "routinely" given a 
second chance. 559 F. Supp., at 794. Accord, App. 8, 30, 
39-40, 68, 73, 163. Ewing argued that a promotional pam-
phlet released by the medical school approximately a week 
before the examination had codified this practice. The pam-
phlet, entitled "On Becoming a Doctor," stated: 
"According to Dr. Gibson, everything possible is done to 
keep qualified medical students in the Medical School. 
This even extends to taking and passing National Board 
Exams. Should a student fail either part of the Na-
tional Boards, an opportunity is provided to make up the 
failure in a second exam." App. 113. 
The District Court concluded that the evidence did not sup-
port either Ewing's contract claim or his promissory estoppel 
claim under governing Michigan law. There was "no suffi-
cient evidence to conclude that the defendants bound them-
selves either expressly or by a course of conduct to give 
"He then took Part I of the NBME . .. . " Ewing v. Board of Regents, 
559 F . Supp. 791, 793-794 (ED Mich. 1983). 
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Ewing a second chance to take Part I of the NBME examina-
tion." 559 F. Supp., at 800. With reference to the pam-
phlet "On Becoming A Doctor," the District Court held that 
"even if [Ewing] had learned of the pamphlet's contents be-
fore he took the examination, and I find that he did not, I 
would not conclude that this amounted either to an unquali-
fied promise to him or gave him a contract right to retake the 
examination." Ibid. 
With regard to Ewing's federal claim, the District Court 
assumed that Ewing had a constitutionally protected prop-
erty interest in his continued enrollment in the Inteflex pro-
gram and that a State University's academic decisions con-
cerning the qualifications of a medical student are "subject to 
substantive due process review" in federal court. Id., at 
798. The District Court, however, found no violation of 
Ewing's due process rights. The trial record, it emphasized, 
was devoid of any indication that the University's decision 
was "based on bad faith, ill will or other impermissible ulte-
rior motives"; to the contrary, the "evidence demonstrate[d] 
that the decision to dismiss plaintiff was reached in a fair and 
impartial manner, and only after careful and deliberate con-
sideration." Id., at 799. To "leave no conjecture" as to his 
decision, the District Judge expressly found that "the evi-
dence demonstrate[d] no arbitrary or capricious action since 
[the Regents] had good reason to dismiss Ewing from the 
program." Id., at 800. 
Without reaching the state-law breach-of-contract and 
promissory-estoppel claims, 5 the Court of Appeals reversed 
the dismissal of Ewing's federal constitutional claim. The 
Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court that Ewing's 
implied contract right to continued enrollment free from arbi-
trary interference qualified as a property interest protected 
• In a footnote, the Court of Appeals stated: "Because we believe this 
case can be disposed of on the § 1983 claim, this court does not expressly 
reach the breach of contract or promissory estoppel claims." Ewing v. 
Board of Regents, 742 F. 2d 913, 914, n. 2 (CA6 1984). 
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by the Due Process Clause, but it concluded that the Univer-
sity had arbitrarily deprived him of that property in violation 
of the Fourteenth Amendment because (1) "Ewing was a 
'qualified' student, as the University defined that term, at 
the time he sat for NBME Part I"; (2) "it was the consistent 
practice of the University of Michigan to allow a qualified 
medical student who initially failed the NBME Part I an 
opportunity for a retest"; and (3) "Ewing was the only Uni-
versity of Michigan medical student who initially failed the 
NBME Part I between 1975 and 1982, and was not allowed an 
opportunity for a retest." Ewing v. Board of Regents, 742 
F. 2d 913, 916 (CA6 1984). The Court of Appeals therefore 
directed the University to allow Ewing to retake the NBME 
Part I, and if he should pass, to reinstate him in the Inteflex 
program. 
We granted the University's petition for certiorari to con-
sider whether the Court of Appeals had misapplied the doc-
trine of "substantive due process." 6 -- U. S. -- (1985). 
We now reverse. 
6 The University's petition for certiorari also presented the question 
whether the Eleventh Amendment constituted a complete bar to the action 
because it was brought against the "Board of Regents of the University of 
Michigan," App. 13, a body corporate. Cf. Florida Department of Health 
v. Florida Nursing Home Assn. , 450 U. S. 147 (1981) (per curiam); Ala-
bama v. Pugh, 438 U. S. 781 (1978) (per curiam). After the petition was 
granted, however, respondent Ewing filed a motion to amend the com-
plaint by joining the individual members of the Board of Regents as named 
defendants in their official capacities. The University did not oppose that 
motion. Tr. of Oral Arg. 12-13. 
Granting the motion merely conforms the pleadings to the "course of pro-
ceedings" in the District Court. Cf. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U. S. --, 
--, n. 14 (1985) (slip op. 7-8, n. 14); Brandon v. Holt, 469 U. S. --, 
-- (1985) (slip op. 5). The record reveals that the Regents frequently 
referred to themselves in the plural, as "defendants," indicating that they 
understood the suit to be against them individually, in their official capaci-
ties, rather than against the Board as a corporate entity. App. 11. Like-
wise, the District Court held that "defendants did not act in violation of 
Ewing's due process rights," 559 F. Supp. , at 799, and accordingly found 
- -
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In Board of Curators, Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 
78, 91-92 (1978), we assumed, without deciding, that federal 
courts can review an academic decision of a public educational 
institution under a substantive due process standard. In 
this case Ewing contends that such review is appropriate be-
cause he had a constitutionally protected property interest in 
his continued enrollment in the Inteflex Program. 7 But 
remembering Justice Brandeis' admonition not to" 'formulate 
a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the 
precise facts to which it is to be applied,'" Ashwander v. 
TV A, 297 U. S. 288, 347 (1936) (concurring opinion), we 
again conclude, as we did in Horowitz, that the precise facts 
disclosed by the record afford the most appropriate basis for 
decision. We therefore accept the University's invitation to 
"assume the existence of a constitutionally protectible prop-
"in favor of the defendants," id., at 800. We consequently grant the mo-
tion, thereby allowing Ewing to name as defendants the individual mem-
bers of the Board of Regents in their official capacities. See Patsy v. 
Florida Board of Regents, 457 U. S. 496, 516, n. 19 (1982). Given our 
resolution of the case, we need not consider the question whether the 
relief sought by Ewing would be available under Eleventh Amendment 
principles. 
7 Ewing and the courts below reasoned as follows: In Board of Regents 
v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564, 577 (1972), this Court held that property interests 
protected by due process are "defined by existing rules or understandings 
that stem from an independent source such as state law." See Goss v. Lo-
pez, 419 U. S. 565, 572-573 (1975). In a companion case, Perry v. Sinder-
mann, 408 U. S. 593, 601-602 (1972) , we held that "agreements implied 
from 'the promisor's words and conduct in the light of the surrounding cir-
cumstances' " could be independent sources of property interests. See 
Bishop v. Wood, 426 U. S. 341, 344 (1976) (implied contracts). According 
to an antiquated race discrimination decision of the Michigan Supreme 
Court (whose principal holding has since been overtaken by events), "when 
one is admitted to a college, there is an implied understanding that he shall 
not be arbitrarily dismissed therefrom." Booker v. Grand Rapids Medi-
cal College, 156 Mich. 95, 99-100, 120 N. W. 589, 591 (1909). From the 
foregoing, Ewing would have us conclude that he had a protectible prop-
erty interest in continued enrollment in the Inteflex program. 
- -
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erty right in [Ewing's] continued enrollment," 8 and hold that 
even if Ewing's assumed property interest gave rise to a sub-
stantive right under the Due Process Clause to continued en-
rollment free from arbitrary state action, the facts of record 
disclose no such action. 
As a preliminary matter, it must be noted that any sub-
stantive constitutional protection against arbitrary dismissal 
would not necessarily give Ewing a right to retake the 
NBME Part I. The constitutionally-protected interest al-
leged by Ewing in his complaint, App. 15, and found by the 
courts below, derives from Ewing's implied contract right to 
continued enrollment free from arbitrary dismissal. The 
District Court did not find that Ewing had any separate right 
to retake the exam and, what is more, explicitly "reject[ed] 
the contract and promissory estoppel claims, finding no suffi-
cient evidence to conclude that the defendants bound them-
selves either expressly or by a course of conduct to give 
Ewing a second chance to take Part I of the NBME examina-
tion." 559 F . Supp., at 800. The Court of Appeals did not 
overturn the District Court's determination that Ewing 
lacked a tenable contract or estoppel claim under Michigan 
law, 9 see supra, at 6, and n. 5, and we accept its reasonable 
8 Tr. of Oral Arg. 3. Consistent with this suggestion, petitioner's an-
swer to Ewing's complaint "admit[ted] that, under Michigan law, [Ewing] 
may have enjoyed a property right and interest in his continued enrollment 
in the Inteflex Program." App. 21. 
• Although there is some ambiguity in its opinion, we understand the 
Court of Appeals to have found "clearly erroneous" the District Court's re-
jection of Ewing's federal substantive due process claim solely because of 
the "undisputed evidence of a consistent pattern of conduct"-namely, the 
"substantial and uncontroverted evidence in the trial record that at the 
time Ewing took the NBME Part I, medical students were routinely given 
a second opportunity to pass it." 742 F . 2d, at 915. The Court of Appeals 
found no "rule" to the effect that medical students are entitled to retake 
failed examinations. Indeed, it relied on the University's "promotional 
pamphlet entitled 'On Becoming a Doctor' " only to the extent that it "me-
morialized the consistent pactice of the medical school with respect to stu-
dents who initially fail that examination." Id. , at 916 (emphasis added). 
- -
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rendering of state law, particularly when no party has chal-
lenged it. 10 
The University's refusal to allow Ewing to retake the 
NBME Part I is thus not actionable in itself. It is, however, 
an important element of Ewing's claim that his dismissal was 
the product of arbitrary state action, for under proper analy-
sis the refusal may constitute evidence of arbitrariness even 
if it is not the actual legal wrong alleged. The question, 
then, is whether the record compels the conclusion that the 
A property interest in a second examination, however, cannot be in-
ferred from a consistent practice without some basis in state law. Yet in 
this case the Court of Appeals did not reverse the District Court's finding 
that Ewing was not even aware of the contents of the pamphlet and left 
standing its holding that the statements in this promotional tract did not 
"amoun[t] either to an unqualified promise to him or ... a contract right to 
retake the examination" under state law. 559 F. Supp., at 800. We rec-
ognize, of course, that ''mutually explicit understandings" may operate to 
create property interests. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U. S., at 601. But 
such understandings or tacit agreements must support "a legitimate claim 
of entitlement" under "'an independent source such as state law . . . .' " 
Id., at 602, n. 7 (quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S., at 577). 
The District Court, it bears emphasis, held that the University's liberal re-
testing custom gave rise to no state law entitlement to retake the NBME 
Part I. We rejected an argument similar to Ewing's in Board of Regents 
v. Roth. In that case Dr. Roth asserted a property interest in continued 
employment by virtue of the fact that "of four hundred forty-two non-ten-
ured professors, four were not renewed during [a particular] academic 
year." Brief for Respondent in Board of Regents v. Roth, 0. T. 1971, 
No. 71-162, p. 28 (footnote and citation omitted). Absent a state statute 
or university rule or "anything approaching a 'common law' of re-employ-
ment," however, we held that Dr. Roth had no property interest in the re-
newal of his teaching contract. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S., at 
578, n. 16. 
10 "In dealing with issues of state law that enter into judgments of fed-
eral courts, we are hesitant to overrule decisions by federal courts skilled 
in the law of particular states unless their conclusions are shown to be un-
reasonable." Propper v. Clark, 337 U. S. 472, 486-487 (1949). Accord, 
Haring v. Prosise, 462 U. S. 306, 314, n. 8 (1983); Leroy v. Great Western 
United Corp., 443 U. S. 173, 181, n. 11 (1979); Butner v. United States, 
440 U. S. 48, 58 (1979); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U. S., at 345-347. 
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University acted arbitrarily in dropping Ewing from the 
Inteflex program without permitting a reexamination. 
It is important to remember that this is not a case in which 
the procedures used by the University were unfair in any re-
spect; quite the contrary is true. Nor can the Regents be 
accused of concealing nonacademic or constitutionally imper-
missible reasons for expelling Ewing; the District Court 
found that the Regents acted in good faith. 
Ewing's claim, therefore, must be that the University mis-
judged his fitness to remain a student in the Inteflex pro-
gram. The record unmistakably demonstrates, however, 
that the faculty's decision was made conscientiously and with 
careful deliberation, based on an evaluation of the entirety of 
Ewing's academic career. When judges are asked to review 
the substance of a genuinely academic decision, such as this 
one, they should show great respect for the faculty's profes-
sional judgment. 11 Plainly, they may not override it unless it 
is such a substantial departure from accepted academic 
norms as to demonstrate that the person or committee re-
sponsible did not actually exercise professional judgment. 
Cf. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U. S. 307, 323 (1982). 
Considerations of profound importance counsel restrained 
judicial review of the substance of academic decisions. As 
JUSTICE WHITE has explained: 
"Although the Court regularly proceeds on the as-
sumption that the Due Process Clause has more than a 
procedural dimension, we must always bear in mind that 
the substantive content of the Clause is suggested nei-
ther by its language nor by preconstitutional history; 
that content is nothing more than the accumulated prod-
uct of judicial interpretation of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
11 "University faculties must have the widest range of discretion in mak-
ing judgments as to the academic performance of students and their enti-
tlement to promotion or graduation." Board of Curators, Univ. of Mo. v. 
Horowitz, 435 U. S. 78, 96, n. 6 (1978) (POWELL, J. , concurring). See id., 
at 90-92 (opinion of the Court). 
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Amendments. This is ... only to underline Mr. Justice 
Black's constant reminder to his colleagues that the 
Court has no license to invalidate legislation which it 
thinks merely arbitrary or unreasonable. " Moore v. 
East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494, 543-544 (1977) (WHITE, 
J., dissenting). See id. , at 502 ( opinion of POWELL, J.). 
Added to our concern for lack of standards is a reluctance to 
trench on the prerogatives of state and local educational insti-
tutions and our responsibility to safeguard their academic 
freedom, "a special concern of the First Amendment." 
Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U. S. 589, 603 (1967). 12 
If a "federal court is not the appropriate forum in which to 
review the multitude of personnel decisions that are made 
daily by public agencies," Bishop v. Wood, 426 U. S. , at 349, 
far less is it suited to evaluate the substance of the multitude 
of academic decisions that are made daily by faculty members 
of public educational institutions-decisions that require "an 
expert evaluation of cumulative information and [are] not 
readily adapted to the procedural tools of judicial or adminis-
trative decisionmaking." Board of Curators, Univ. of Mis-
souri v. Horowitz, 435 U. S., at 89-90. 
This narrow avenue for judicial review precludes any con-
clusion that the decision to dismiss Ewing from the Inteflex 
program was such a substantial departure from accepted aca-
12 Academic freedom thrives not only on the independent and uninhibited 
exchange of ideas among teachers and students, see Keyishian v. Board of 
Regents, 385 U. S. , at 603; Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U. S. 234, 250 
(1957) (opinion of Warren, C. J .), but also, and somewhat inconsistently, 
on autonomous decisionmaking by the academy itself, see University of 
California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 312 (1978) (opinion of Pow-
ELL, J.); Sweezy v. N ew Hampshire, 354 U. S. , at 263 (Frankfurter, J. , 
concurring in the result). Discretion to determine, on academic grounds, 
who may be admitted to study, has been described as one of "the four es-
sential freedoms" of a university. University of California Regents v. 
Bakke, 438 U. S. , at 312 (opinion of POWELL, J .) (quoting Sweezy v. N ew 
Hampshire, 354 U. S. , at 263 (Frankfurter, J. , concurring in the result)) 
(internal quotations omitted). 
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demic norms as to demonstrate that the faculty did not exer-
cise professional judgment. Certainly his expulsion cannot 
be considered aberrant when viewed in isolation. The Dis-
trict Court found as a fact that the Regents "had good reason 
to dismiss Ewing from the program." 559 F. Supp. , at 800. 
Before failing the NBME Part I, Ewing accumulated an un-
enviable academic record characterized by low grades, seven 
incompletes, and several terms during which he was on an ir-
regular or reduced course load. Ewing's failure of his medi-
cal boards, in the words of one of his professors, "merely cul-
minate[d] a series of deficiencies. . . . In many ways, it's the 
straw that broke the camel's back." App. 79. Accord, id., 
at 7, 54-55, 72-73. 13 Moreover, the fact that Ewing was 
"qualified" in the sense that he was eligible to take the exami-
nation the first time does not weaken this conclusion, for 
after Ewing took the NBME Part I it was entirely reasonable 
for the faculty to reexamine his entire record in the light of 
the unfortunate results of that examination. Admittedly, it 
may well have been unwise to deny Ewing a second chance. 
Permission to retake the test might have saved the Univer-
sity the expense of this litigation and conceivably might have 
demonstrated that the members of the Promotion and Re-
view Board misjudged Ewing's fitness for the medical profes-
sion. But it nevertheless remains true that his dismissal 
from the lnteflex program rested on an academic judgment 
that is not beyond the pale of reasoned academic decision-
making when viewed against the background of his entire ca-
13 Even viewing the case from Ewing's perspective, we cannot say that 
the explanations and extenuating circumstances he offered were so compel-
ling that their rejection can fairly be described as irrational. For example, 
the University might well have concluded that Ewing's sensitivity to diffi-
culties in his personal life suggested an inability to handle the stress inher-
ent in a career in medicine. The inordinate amount of time Ewing devoted 
to his extracurricular essay writing may reasonably have revealed to the 
University a lack of judgment and an inability to set priorities. 
.. - -
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reer at the University of Michigan, including his singularly 
low score on the NBME Part I examination. 14 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the 
case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
"Nor does the University's termination of Ewing substantially deviate 
from accepted academic norms when compared with its treatment of other 
students. To be sure, the University routinely gave others an opportu-
nity to retake the NBME Part I. But despite tables recording that some 
students with more incompletes or low grades were permitted to retake 
the examination after failing it the first time, App. 105-111, and charts in-
dicating that these students lacked the outside research and honor grade in 
clinical work that Ewing received, id. , at 119-120, we are not in a position 
to say that these students were "similarly situated" with Ewing. The Pro-
motion and Review Board presumably considered not only the raw statisti-
cal data but the nature and seriousness of the individual deficiencies and 
their concentration in particular disciplines-in Ewing's case, the hard sci-
ences. The Board was able to take into account the numerous incompletes 
and make-up examinations Ewing required to secure even marginally pass-
ing grades, and it could view them in connection with his reduced course 
loads. Finally, it was uniquely positioned to observe Ewing's judgment, 
self-discipline, and ability to handle stress, and was thus especially well-
situated to make the necessarily subjective judgment of Ewing's prospects 
for success in the medical profession. The insusceptibility of promotion 
decisions such as this one to rigorous judicial review is borne out by the 
fact that 19 other Inteflex students, some with records that a judge might 
find "better" than Ewing's, were dismissed by the faculty without even 
being allowed to take the NBME Part I a first time. App. 165-166. Cf. 
id., at 66 (nine Inteflex students terminated after suffering one deficiency 
and failing one course after warning). 
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1. Is the Eleventh Amendment a bar to 
federal court jurisdiction in this case? 
2. Is a state medical school's decision to 
dismiss an academically deficient student subject to 
substantive due process review under 42 u.s.c. 1983? 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Facts 
In the fall of 1975 resp entered a special program 
at the University of Michigan ("Michigan") called Inteflex, 
leading to an undergraduate degree and a medical degree in 





serious academic difficulties, taking incompletes, 




resp completed the four year course of study preparatory to 
entering clinical study. Before entering clinical study 
resp, like other med students, was required to take Part I 
of the NBME. Because of his dismal record, and pursuant to 
prior warnings, resp was informed that a less than 
satisfactory performance on the NBME would be grounds for 
dismissal. Resp received the lowest score ever received by 
a Michigan student on the test. The med school's Promotion 
✓ 
and Review Board voted unanimously to dismiss resp from the 
program. Resp requested reconsideration, and the Board 
held a hearing and listened to resp's excuses. At the 
hearing resp admitted that he understood a letter sent to 
him prior to the test warning that he was on probation and 
that further deficiencies could result in dismissal. The 
Board again voted unanimously to dismiss him. Resp 
appealed to the medical school's Executive Committee. 
After meeting with resp the Committee voted unanimously to 
affirm the dismissal. 
B. Decisions Below "-v, /~~tr. c,,-f Lt, · ~ ~ -\ 
Resp filed suit in EDMich under §1983 ) seeking 
~
injunctive relief ~ d damages. He also alleged state law 
contract claims. His §1983 claim was based on his 
J( \' 
contention that he had a property interest in his status as 
a med student. He made no claim of deprivation of that 
interest by procedural due process violations; instead he 
- - 3. 
claimed that he had been denied substantive due process 
because the 
capricious. 
decision to dismiss him was 
✓ 
The DC dismissed all claims. 
arbitrary and 
While the DC 
/)c_ -.___ 
reasoned that academic dismissals were subject to 
.. J/"~ substantive due process review, it held that such review is 1/ ~ limited to "whether the decision was based on arbitrary or 
,tp.,~ ~ •' capricious 
:;~ be academic 
factors which are not reasonably cons i dered to 
criteria." (Pet. App. 25a) . The state claims 
~ of breach 
dismissed. 
of contract and promissory estoppel were 








of the Eleventh Amendment. The Regents ------apparently accompanied their Eleventh Amendment argument 
against damages with statements that the plaintiff (resp) ;e,_
7
~ 
would still be entitled to equitable relief. In other ~ 
words, instead of relying on the fact that plaintiff had ~ 
sued the Regents as a state government body, which would-'//~ 
preclude any claim, the Regents were relying on Edelman v. ~ 
~'.id 
Jordan's prohibition against damages. 415 US 651 (1974) ~ 
CA6 rev 'd. The CA decided that resp did have ~ 
property right in his status as a student, that substantive -
due process was applicable, and that the dismissal of resp 
"----- ----- -- - -· -
had been arbitrary and capricious. The sole factual bas i s 
of the CA holding was that it was the consistent practice 
of the med school to allow students a second chance to pass 
the NBME. Of the forty students who had taken and failed 
the test since 1975, resp was the only one who had been 
refused a second chance, al though other students had been 
~ 
} t ~ 
• 
• 
- - 4. 
denied permission even to take the test. The CA ordered 
resp reinstated and allowed to retake the test. 
II. DISCUSSION 
A. The Eleventh Amendment Issue (~ 141~'5 ~ Sk:6; 4~ -
As is clear from the face of the briefs, resp has ~ 
~
sued the Regents of the University of Michigan as a state J 
government body and not as individuals. Resp is a resident 
{
of California. That appears to 
prohibit~ by the Eleventh Amendment. 
be the parad i gm case 
But, as is often the 
case with Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence, things are not 
as they seem. Two factors make it possible that this case ---
can be heard in federal court despite its facial violation. 
'-~ -
(9 Waiver. -. - Resp contends that petr has always treated 
this case as though the Regents had been sued individually. 
In the DC, the Regents pre~sed for dismissal of the 
monetary damages on Eleventh Amendment grounds, but did not 
do so as to the injunctive relief sought. In fact, the 
Regents stated to the DC that even if they prevailed on the 
dismissal of the monetary relief, resp would still be 
entitled to equitable relief. See Brief in Opp. to Pet. 
for Cert. at 17-i8. Resp claims that this and other 
actions amount to a waiver of the Eleventh Amendment 
defense, citing Toll v. Moreno, 458 us 1, 18 (1982). 
full does not support resp's contention that petr 
should be deemed to have waived its Eleventh Amendment 
immunity. Toll involved a specific waiver of immunity by 
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tried to argue that this Court's subsequent GVR of the case 
had so altered the case that the prior waiver was no longer 
in effect. In contrast, the present case presents no such ---------- ~ -- -
specific waiver • 
...., --- -
its immunity. _______. 
A~ ost, petr misunderstood the scope of 
Following the decision in Pennhurst State 
S:hool and Hospital v. Halderman, 104 set 900 (1984), petr 
rethought its position and renewed its Eleventh Amendment 
argument. In other contexts the Court has required that 
Eleventh Amendment waivers be very clear, see Edelman, 






184 (1964) (waiver by congressional enactment). 
think that any of the actions cited by resp 
I do not 1-;,,uJ 
amount to aj ~ 
waiver of petr's Eleventh Amendment immunity . 
a. Pennhurst. Both parties cite to Pennhurst to 
support their Eleventh Amendment positions. Resp says that 
this case is distinguishable from Pennhurst because this 
case is grounded on a claim of federal law, while Pennhurst 
was based on requiring states to adhere to state law. True 
enough, but what resp neglects to mention is that petr does 
rot need Pennhurst for protection if it has not waived its 
immunity, since the Eleventh Amendment bars any suit on any ------- -
claim against petr ui federal court, so long as resp 
- --
continues to make his claim against the State of Michigan 
itself, through a state agency known as the Regents. Resp 
also fails to deal with the SG's argument that resp's claim 
is in reality only a state law claim once the substantive 
due process claim is properly understood. If that argument 
• 
- - 6 • 
is accepted, then certainly Pennhurst will be directly 
applicable, because federal courts would be in the position 
of telling the state to abide by principles of state law, a 
result foreclosed in Pennhurst. This would be so even if 
resp's complaint is amended to include individual Regents, 
since Pennhurst involved a suit against state officers in 
their official capacities. 1 
1 '1,hortly after finishing this memo, ~ filed with this Court ~ 
a motion to amend his complaint to name individual Regents. 
7 
The  
rrotion is a ace wit my recommen ation to grant. T s it!> 




issues that would exist i r' the complaint were not amended, and ~ 
should be read Qnly if _zou intend to deny leave=-to amend the 
complaint';) Amend i ng fhe Complaint~ Resp argues that even if 
there i s a technical defect in the pleadings, under present law 
he should be allowed simply to amend his complaint, even at th i s 
late date, and have the judgment upheld on the merits. He cites 
two Supreme Court cases for that proposition. The first is 
:Erandon v. Holt, 105 set 873 (1985). In Brandon, the plaintiff 
sued the Director of the Memphis Police, but did not name the 
City of Memphis. Brandon began as a §1983 case before Monroe v. 
!ape was overruled in Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social 
Services, 436 US 658 (1978), which explains why the city was not 
sued. Both the proof offered and the DC findings of fact 
demonstrated an understanding that the Director was being sued in 
his official capacity as an agent of the City. The Court 
recognized that the plaintiff would probably be allowed to amerrl 
the pleadings to conform to the proof, and proceeded to decide 







Court recognize that he will be allowed even at this late date to 
amend his complaint to name individual Regents, and to decide the 
case on the merits. I think that rese 's argument dilutes Ex l-1~ 
Iarte Young, 209 us 123 (1908) and - does serious ha rm t o tbe 0 
Eleventh Amendment. However, based on ~atsy v. Board of Regents, 
45 ~ 5-516 n. 19 (1982) I do not think a majority of the 
Court will decline to take jurisdiction i n this case based on 
these Eleventh Amendment considerations. Patsy involved a §1983 
action against Florida International University for denial of 
employment advancement based on race and sex. The Court, while 
noting that the University was an arm of the state, inexplicably 
included the Eleventh Amendment issue in its remand to the DC. 
YQur 1"Rsent expressed · a issue very c early. I 
do not now whether those views would lead you to deny leave to 
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B. Substantive Due -recess 
Resp's only claim on the merits is his contention 
h h h d ' ' . "' . h . d . 1 tat e a a property interest in is status as a me ica 
student, and that he was deprived of that interest by a 
violation of substantive due process in that his dismissal 
was arbitrary and capricious. The factual basis of the 
argument is the fact that it was the normal practice of the 
rredical school to allow its students a second chance at 
passing the NBME test. His claim is clearly without merit. 
'Ihe only issue for the Court is on what basis it will 
reverse the CA6. There are several possibilities, listed 
below in order of attractiveness. 
1. Limited Review. The strongest position, both in terms 
-------------
of its base in authority and its likelihood of capturing 
the votes of this Court, is the position taken by the DC 
below that substantive due process is available for 
academic dismissals, but that such determinations will be 
overturned only when they are arbitrary or capricious, such 
as dismissals based on ill will or other bad motive. That 
position finds support in a long line of cases that reflect 
(Footnote 1 continued from previous page) 
Court. If so, you may wish to concur in the judgment only and 
cite to your dissent in Patsy, or you may choose actually to 
dissent based on these jurisdictional considerations. In any 
event, un~.s.,int is amended it is clear that the Court 
la~ n. Whether that ought to be solved by the 
simple expedient of allowing amendment of the complaint troubles 
me, but in the end my view is that leave to amend ought to be 
grante~ 
~ ~ ~~>4, ~ -/4) 
~~7~~~~ 
~ ~ ~s-~ ~- /3t,J H-t--~ 
~~U-(~t..l-,lo~~ ~~~ ~ 
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this Court's deference to educators on academic matters 2 
and the fact that academic freedom is a special concern of 
the First Amendment 3 • The DC based the availability of 
substantive due process review itself on numerous lower 
court opinions, some of them cited in Board of Curators v. 
fbrowitz, 435 US 78 (1978), and the fact that the Horowitz 
opinion left the question open, deciding only that petr in 
that case was not entitled to relief even if such review 
W=re available.4 It also is clear that subs tan ti ve due 
process review is available for deprivation of liberty 
interests. 5 
In this case, the Court could take either of two 
approaches consistent with the DC opinion. It could do 
------ -
just as it did in Horowitz, and leave open the question of 
2 See, e.g., Board of Curators of the University of Missouri v. 
Horowitz, 435 US 78, 90-92 (1978) 
3 See, e.g., Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 
438 US 265, 312 (1978) (opinion ofv1>owell, J.); Sweezy v. New 
Hampshire, 354 US 234, 263 (1957) v{ Frankfurter, J., concurring in 
the result). 
4 In addition, amici NEA, et al., cite Harrah Independent School 
District v. Marti~ US 194 (1979), for the proposition that 
this Court has engaged in substantive due process review of state 
property right deprivations. The Court in Harrah denied a 
tenured teacher's claim that she had been deprived of a property 
interest by arbitrary action in violation of her substantive due 
process rights. The short per curiam opinion does not make it 
clear whether the Court was accepting the notion of substantive 
due process review of academic decisions, or whether it was just 
explaining the lack of merit of that claim in a generally 
meritless petition. 
5 Kelley v. Johnson, 425 US 238, 244 (1976). 
• 
• 
- - 9. 
whether such review is available, while at the same time 
deciding that even if it were available, resp would not 
have a valid claim. Or it could expressly decide tha ~ such 
review is available in exceptional cases in federal ~ourts, 
but that resp did not have such a case. In either event, 
the Court could make clear that the CA had misapplied the 
--> 
legal standard, and that review of academic dismissals m 
substantive due process grounds is available on l y for 
di :niss:i: ba: d on nonacademic : eason~ ll ~ or o~ her ~ ufrz-- ~=== ~~ I / 
bad motive, but that the sufficiency of the academic 
reasons for the dismissal will not be subject to review in 
federal court.6 
2. The SG's Position. The SG has advanced a theory of the ~G-5 
case that deserves an "A" for effort. Because of its ~ 
novelty and lack of support in authority, it is less likely 
to garner a majority, but it me r its a close look. The SG 
-----
argues that even if resp has a legitimate property interest 
in his status as a student, not every property interest 
rises to the level of meriting substantive due process 
i;:t:otection. Property interests protected by procedural due ____________. 
process are not created by the Constitution, but are 
derived from independent sources such as state law. 
6 This was the approach taken in the DC below, although the DC 
improperly required a long bench trial following lengthy 
discovery to arrive at that conclusion. It is also the test 
employed in an impo r tant DC opinion summarizing existing lower 
federl court case law, Connelly v. University of Vermont, 244 
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due process rights are Substantive 
Constitution. Subs tan ti ve due process 
created by 
is founded on 
the 
the 
idea that the Supreme Court has interpreted the due process -
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to confer certain 
substantive rights based mainly on the Bill of Rights. -~ - ----------------
This creates an important distinction between deprivations 
of property rights and deprivations of life or liberty 
interests. Life and liberty interests, in almost every 
case, are created by the Constitution. Almost by 
definition, every judicially cognizable life or liberty 
interest is accompanied by substantive due process 
protection. But property rights are created by state law. 
There should be no presumption that by virtue of the fact 
that a state 
interest, the 
has defined some 
Constitution 
interest as a property 
must automatically be 
interpreted to mean that such state property rights are 
clothed with substantive due process protection. Instead, 
state property rights must be examined to see whether the 
state-created right merits substantive federal 
constitutional protection. To do otherwise would allow the 
state tail to wag the federal constitutional dog. In 
addition, property rights al r eady enjoy certain protections 
that life and liberty interest do not enjoy, e.g., just 
compensation for taking. The SG would have this Court 5 &-
decide that any property rights associated with academic 
dis o not rise to the level of meriting substantive 
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substantive due process rights in property from substantive 
due process rights to life and liberty, the SG's position _____ ____,, 
allows the Court narrowly to define those property rights 
that will be accorded subs tan ti ve due process protection --------- ________ ......_ _____ ----------------
without affecting the many cases dealing with substantive 
~ ------.... ------ ---
due process rights in life and liberty. ------ - -
The argument is facially very appealing -----~ ~ • Like 
nost novel arguments, it is supported only weakly by ______,. 
existing authority. The only direct support for the -------- 7 :i;roposi tion is a case from the CA7. But nothing 
forecloses the argument. The NEA in an excellent brief 
attempted to rebut the SG' s position by showing that the 
SCT had already decided cases involving deprivations of 
property interests on substantive due process grounds. See 
Amicus Brief of NEA at pp. 5-8. None of the cases cited 
would foreclose adoption of the SG' s arguments. The NEA 
also cites to cases involving substantive due process 
review of deprivations of liberty interests, but the very 
nature of the SG's arguments rebuts those cases. 
The SG's position would mean that resp is left 
with essentially a state law claim. As such, this Court 
would lack further jurisdiction under Pennhurst • 
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111. CONCLUSION 
1. Once amendment of the complaint is allowed, 
the Eleventh Amendment is not a bar to jurisdiction in this 
suit, nor does it immunize petr. But if the Court 
subsequently adopts the argument of the SG, then 
jurisdiction would be improper under Pennhurst, since the 
Court would be in the position of ordering a state court to 
abide by its own laws. 
2. Petr's substantive due process claim is 
without merit. There are two main approaches that could be 
taken to overturn the CA6. Although the SG's position is 
facially very appealing, the DC's approach has g r eater 
support in the case law. ___ _____, 
( 
OOTE: Resp' s Motion to Amend Complaint is attached. ~ · 
[To: t-'\\"E) / -::r ()5T\Lt \>c) H--0 -
Tlt\\ ~ \-\ou\<£ 
(5.._{t M cxf\'1, M~ 
'oeJ\ M~ a._ 
iwlN(:, . N\~\:e_ 














Motion of Respondent for 
Leave to Amend the 
Amended Complaint 
[This case is scheduled 
for oral argument on 
October 8, 1985] 
SUMMARY: seeks leave to amend his complaint to sue 
petrs as indTviduals in their official capacities. Petrs have, 
inter alia, challenged the CA 6's judgment on the ground that 
the Eleventh Amendment bars injunctive relief against the 
regents of the university unless they are sued individually in 
their official capacities. Resp asserts that his proposed 
changes will conform the pleadings to the evidence presented 
below and will "eliminate needless controversy between the 
parties" by removing the Eleventh Amendment problem. 
BACKGROUND: In 1981, resp filed suit in DC (ED Mich.) 
against petrs for injunctive relief and money damages under 
Hot&, -fheA'l grM\+-
N\l~ 
- - 2 - -
42 U.S.C. §1983 alleging that he had been dismissed from medical 
school in violation of his substantive due process rights. 
After a bench trial, the DC ruled in favor of petrs finding that 
resp had failed the standardized written test administered by 
the National Board of Medical Examiners (NSME). The DC 
concluded that petrs' decision to dismiss resp had been based on 
academic grounds and was not influenced by "ill will or ulterior 
motives." 
The CA 6 reversed, noting that because of resp had a 
"property interest" in his education, he could not be 
arbitrarily dismissed from medical school. The CA 6 found that 
in seven years no student had been dismissed from the medical 
school without being given a second chance to pass the NBME's 
test. On this basis, the CA 6 concluded that petrs' action was 
"arbitrary and capricious." The court ordered resp reinstated, 
so that he could again sit for the exam. If resp passed the 
exam, the CA 6's judgment required that resp be allowed to 
continue in medical school. 
In January 1985, the medical school petitioned the Court 
for cert arguing, inter alia, that the CA 6 lacked the authority 
to order resp's reinstatement because (1) resp had failed to sue 
the regents of the university as individuals in their official 
capacities and (2) this Court's decision in Board of Curators of 
the University of Missouri v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978), bars 
the federal courts from "second guessing" the regents' decision 
to dismiss a student for academic reasons. The Court granted 
cert to review petrs' claims on March 25, 1985. 
- - 3 - -
The instant motion was filed August 12, 1985. The matter 
is presently set for oral argument on October 8, 1985. 
CONTENTIONS: Resp alleges that Eleventh Amendment issue is 
not new to the parties. Resp notes that petrs successfully 
asserted the Eleventh Amendment as a defense to resp's claim for 
money damages. However, at the same time, petrs conceded that 
resp's claims for injunctive relief were not barred by the 
Eleventh Amendment. (See Joint Appendix pp. 5-6). Resp, 
without specific citations to the record, alleges that at trial 
he produced evidence of each regent's arbitrary conduct without 
objection from petrs' counsel. Resp therefore asserts that he 
proved his case against each regent for purposes of §1983, and 
complains that now, for the first time, "in an effort to avoid 
liability, [petrs] ... argue that [resp] has not sued [the 
regents] individually in their official capacities. 11 1 
Resp, citing arguments from his brief in opposition to 
cert, contends that petrs' Eleventh Amendment claim is not 
dispositive of the case for at least three reasons. He argues 
that (1) petrs, by their conduct, have waived whatever immunity 
they might have had under §1983, (2) even if they have not 
waived their immunity, petrs are properly sued as "The Regents," 
and (3) even if the complaint is defective, resp should be 
allowed to amend his complaint to conform to proof at trial. As 
to this last point, resp states that the Eleventh Amendment 
issue is "readily curable" by amendment to the pleadings. He 
also asserts that petrs will suffer no prejudice because the 
lpetrs apparently did not argue the Eleventh Amendment 
issue to the CA 6 on appeal or in their petn for rehearing en 
bane. 
- - 4 - -
amendment merely conforms the pleadings to the proof at trial. 
In support of his request, resp cites this Court's decision in 
Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. , 105 S.Ct. 873 (1985) and several 
circuit court opinions2 allowing "late" amendments under F. R. 
Civ. P. 15(b). 
DISCUSSION: Fed. Rule Civ. Pro. 15(b) states in pertinent 
part as follows: 
When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried 
by express or implied consent of the parties, they 
shall be treated in all respects as if they had been 
raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the 
pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform 
to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon 
motion of any party at any time, even after judgment; but 
failure so to amend does not affect the result of the 
trial of these issues. 
In Brandon v. Holt, supra, petrs failed to name a 
municipality as a .defendant in their §1983 action because their 
complaint was filed before this Court's decision in Monell v. 
New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978)~3 
However, the Court found that recovery against the city was 
justified because it was "abundantly clear" from the record that 
the resp had been sued in his official capacity. Relying on 
F.R. Civ. P. 15(b), the Court stated that petrs were "entitled" 
to amend their pleadings to conform to proof even at such a 
"late stage in the proceedings." 53 U.S.L.W. at 4124. 
LResp cites Arthur v. Ny,uist 573 F.2d 134 (CA 2 1978), 
cert denied 439 U.S. 860; Jae son v. Hayakawa, 682 F.2d 1344 
(CA 9 1982); Ga~ Students Or§. of Univ. of New Hampshire v. 
Bonner, 509 F.2 652 (CA 1 1 74). Resp also cites additional 
Supreme Court authority in Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 
496, 515-16, n. 19 (1982); Moreno v. Toll, 458 U.S. 1, 18 (1982). 
3Monell overruled the Court's previous decision in Monroe 
v. ~ape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), thus permitting §1983 suits 
against municipalities. 
- - 5 - -
Nevertheless, the Court decided to "proceed to decide the legal 
issues without first insisting that such a formal amendment be 
filed." Id. 
Although this case can be distinguished from Brandon on the 
ground that resp's failure to properly name petrs in his 
complaint is not excused by any recent change in the law 
regarding liability under §1983, it does appear that the Court 
may in its discretion permit resp to amend his complaint at this 
stage of the proceedings. F. R. Civ. P. 15(b) clearly gives the 
Court the authority to allow such an amendment "at any time." 
This authority is not dependent upon the existence of an 
intervening change in the law. 
However, because the motion is addressed to the Court's 
discretion and because argument in the case is imminent (October 
8, 1985), the Court need not separately consider this matter. 
Rather, the motion may be considered and decided along with the 
merits of the case. A formal amendment of the complaint may not 
be necessary, if the Court decides to address resp's claims that 
petrs were properly named and/or waived their immunity by their 
conduct. After full deliberation on the Eleventh Amendment 
issue and a complete review of the relevant portions of the 
record, the Court will be better able to determine whether 
formal amendment to the pleadings is necessary and appropriate. 
If the Court accepts resp's amended pleading, an appropriate 
reference could be inserted in the opinion. 
CONCLUSION: The Court may, in its discretion, permit resp 
to amend his complaint to conform to proof. However, because 
argument in the case is imminent (October 8, 1985), the Court 
• - - 6 - -
need not consider the motion separately. The motion should be 
considered along with the merits of the case. After full 
deliberation and review of the record, the Court will be better 
able to determine whether formal amendment is necessary and 
appropriate. 
There is no response. 
9/12/85 Niddrie 
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To: Justice Powell 
From: Mike IIJ/1/¥'.J-
-
Re: Eleventh Amendment issue in Regents, Univ. Mich. v. Ew i ng 
?k:.f if1.. --
This memo refers to your concerns about the eleventh 
amendment issues in Ewing. I should say that I think my memo was 
unnecessarily confusing because my analysis pointed to an 
Eleventh Amendment bar to jurisdiction, but my recommendation was 
to allow amendment of the complaint. That recommendation was 
based on my impression from reading Patsy and from the grant of 
cert in this case that your fellow Justices were not interested 
in being diverted from consideration of the merits by a latent 
Eleventh Amendment issue. I now think that recommendation was 
ill-advised. I am pleased to see that you are still interested 
in pursuing the concerns you expressed in your dissent in Patsy, 
and I would like to reverse myself and recommend that you deny 
leave to amend the complaint. My reasons for doing so were 
vaguely foreshadowed in my earlier bench memo; I will make them 
explicit here. 
I. DISCUSSION 
A. The Eleventh Amendment as a Bar to the Relief Sought 
There are two Eleventh Amendment issues in this case. 
The first is the straightforward issue of whether the Eleventh 
Amendment is a bar to this case. That is clouded somewhat by the 
l ~.J.:;, ) 
fact that the petr compleWy misunderstands its Ele~enth 
,\ -
Amendment claim. P erhaps that is why the Court voted to grant 
~
cert despite the Eleventh Amendment issue; the Eleventh Amendment 
\ 
- - J.. 
issue raised by the petr is weak. Petr relies on Pennhurst, 104 
S. Ct. 900. 
application 
Actually, the best claim derives from a simple ~ 
of Ex Parte Young, 209 US 123, and Edelman v. Jordan, -----~ ~ 415 us 651. 
1
',L8r not suing the state, for Eleventh Amendment purposes, if he is 
The combination of those cases means that a party is 
~ 
~~ 
only seeking prospective injunctive relief. This is true even if 
the party is suing state officials. The rationale is that in 1-~ 
~ such a case the party is only seeking to require the official to 
~$form his future conduct to the requirements of ~e~eral law; 
~ and that as long as such an official is not acting in accordance 
~ -
• 
with federal law, his actions cannot be 
The two key factors are tha t4he relief 
attributed to the state. 
sought must be -
pros;ctive, an~us~ not directl;:::k money damages (although ----
an award of prospective equitable relief may have an impact on 
the state treasury). It is clear after Edelman and Cory v. 
fl 11~ 
White, 457 US 85, 90-91 (1982) that ~o for~- ret_rQ.active_ reli~f r -
• 
~ 
is available against state officials in their official _____________ =-"'r,,, ~ .... ...., 
capacities. While Ex Parte Young authorizes some forms of 
prospective relief against state officials in their official 
capacities in order to vindicate federal supremacy, the Court has 
declined "to extend the fiction of Young to encompass retroactive 
relief, for to do so would effectively eliminate the 
constitutional immunity of the states." Pennhurst at 911. 
Given the above principles, it is a little surprising 
that resp Ewing could have gotten this far with his case, because 
~ -- -
it clearly seeks to remedy a 1past violation. ~ Ewing alleges that 
~~ -~ ::::::.. 





Pennhurst stands for the proposition that the Eleventh 
Amendment bars suits in federal court that seek to require state 
officials to conform their conduct to state law. Under Pennhurst 
it is not important whether the relief sought is prospective or 
retroactive; the issue is whether the harm complained of is a 
violation of state law. Thus, if one accepts resp's contention 
that the University has violated his federal substantive due 
process rights, then resp has a valid federal law claim under 
§1983 and petr's argument that this suit is foreclosed by 
? 
Pennhurst is not accurate. However, if one accepts the SG's 5GJ 
argument that this case does not even present a violation of 
11 sub-;tantive due pro~::, th~: Ewi~g i ; left ... without a feder~l 
c~ At most, he is left with a claim that the University did 
not comply with its own policies, a case clearly foreclosed by 
Pennhurst. Acceptance of the SG's argument deprives resp of 
' ~ ----=-----
federal question jurisdiction. [ I would like to clear up 
another point of confusion in my bench memo. I stated that the 
approach of the DC to the merits of this case was the stronger 
approach. By that I meant that it had more support in the case 
law and was more likely to garner a majority. But I actually 
prefer the SG's approach bec~use it prevents such suits 
being filed, thus saving universities from the enormous 
r --- --------------......... __________ __,,., 
e~O 
4 ., 




(1) Resp seeks relief for a past violation of federal 





prospective relief. Even if his suit were against state 
officials and not a state agency, Edelman establishes that suits 
____..> 
against state officials seeking retroactive relief are in 





(2) In addition to the above bar, resp's suit is also I 
barred irrespective of the relief sought because he named a ~ ta~e 
age~ - a~;-~~~ ~~belo-;;:-------  
and consequently this Court, of jurisdiction. If that were the 
only jurisdictional problem with the case, then the Court in 
Patsy has indicated that it might be willing to decide the merits 
anyway in anticipation of leave to amend being granted freely 
below . But in this case leave to amend ought to be denied, both 
because there are other more serious jurisdictional problems with 
the case, and because the Court does not presently have 
jurisdiction over the case • 
III. Questions for Oral Argument 
1. How does this Court have jurisdiction over this case? 
2. How would you characterize the relief being sought by resp? 
Does he allege any ongoing violation of federal law, or does he 
in any way seek to require these state officials to conform their 
future conduct to the requirements of federal law? 
3. How do you reconcile the retroactive relief sought in this 
case with our statements in Edelman and Pennhurst that 





and seeks an order requiring the Regents to let him retake the 
test. He does not allege any ongoing violation, but only seeks 
3 
relief for a past violation. The relief he seeks is clearly 
foreclosed by the Eleventh ~~ndment • 
r 
.,..__ ------ ~~ -
Both parties may have been confused by cases which 
appear to award retroactive relief against state officials in 
their official capacity. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 433 US 
267 (1977). Those cases award retroactive equitable relief only 
,, \ \ 
when it is ancillary to the primary award of prospective 
equitable relief. The Court's decision in Patsy v. Florida Board Fa.½ 
of Regents, 457 US 496 (1982) also is troubling. In that case, 
the petr alleged employment discrimination and sought an order 
"requiring Defendants to remedy the discrimination practiced upon 
Plaintiff by promoting her to the ni x~~/;;~~ 
consistent with those previously applied for and for which she is 
ualified." Record at '47. While that sounds very much like I pd...~ 
retroactive relief, the issue is a close one d it was not 
brought to the Court's attention. In the present case, however, - -- ,,,,.,-, ,,,,,,,.._.. 
the primary relief sought is unarguably retroactive. --There is no 
prospective relief sought on which to hang retroactive relief. 
The above analysis means that resp's suit is barred by 
the Eleventh Amendment. Despite the language of the majority in 
Patsy, I think that the Eleventh Amendment bar is jurisdictional , 
and deprives the courts below and this Court of jurisdiction over )~ 
~~--- ... --- ...---... ...... --- - ~ ' 
the case. The plain language of the Amendment so requires: "The 
---::-
Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to 
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted 
• 
• 
- - If 
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State 
•.• " Th~ Patsy that the Eleventh Amendment is not 
jurisdictional in the sense that it may be raised and decided by 
the Court on its own motion is~- The case cited, Mt. 
Healthy City Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 US at 279, is inapposite. 
It simply holds that a Board of Education is not an arm of the 
state. Patsy's comments about the nonjurisdictional nature of 
the Eleventh Amendment were wrong, and can only be explained by 
the fact that there was a latent issue of waiver that may have 
prompted a remand • 
B. Amendment of the Complaint 
The fact that resp seeks a remedy for a past violation 
of federal law means that his suit is barred whether or not his 
complaint is amended. That is, his suit is barred if he sues the - ......... -
state directly and it is also barred if he sues individual 
officers in their official capacities. For that reason, the 
motion to amend the complaint is somewhat academic. Even so, it -
ought to be denied not only because granting it does not cure the 
Eleventh Amendment bar, but also because this Court would not 
have jurisdiction to consider it even if the relief sought were 
proper. The entire analysis of Ex Parte Young and Edelman .....--
focuses on when individual officers can be sued in their official 
capacities without suing the state. No op i nion of this Court 
allows any person directly to sue the state. Because of 
plaintiff's admittedly technical mistake of naming "the Regents", 
an official state agency, in his complaint, instead of suing the 
individual Regents, no federal court ever had jurisdiction over 
• 
I 
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this case. This Court's potential jurisdiction over the case is 
appellate. 28 use§ 1254(1) If the courts below lacked 
jurisdiction, so does this Court. See Shanferoke Coal & Supply 
Corp. v. Westchester Corp., 293 us 449 (1935). Resp argues that 
this whole issue is merely semantical, and cites Patsy and 
Brandon v. Holt, 105 S. Ct. 873 (1985) for the idea that the 
Court has expressed a willingness to overlook such "technical" 
violations when it is clear that leave to amend would be freely 
granted below, and proceed to decide the merits. Brandon 
involved municipal immunity under §1983 and therefore did not 
implicate Eleventh Amendment concerns. The party was merely 
allowed to amend the pleadings to conform to the proof offered 
below and to take into account intervening decisions that made 
municipalities liable under §1983. Patsy did not grant a motion 
to amend, but simply decided the merits based on the Court's 
feeling that leave to amend would be freely granted on remand. 
Also, it can be argued that Patsy involved only the technical 
issue of naming the wrong party in the complaint, and not the 
substantive issue of a party seeking an improper remedy that this 
case raised. If the only issue is whether the compla i nt can be 
amended, then it does seem harsh to dismiss the case and force 
the entire thing to be retried upon filing of a new complaint 
naming the correct parties. But much more than that is involved 
here, since even if amendment is allowed, the case is still 






To: Justice Powell 
From: Mike 
Re: Regents, University of Mich. v. Ewing 
Oof~ 
• 
This short note deals with an additional reason in favor 
of accepting the SG's argument. The gist of the SG's argument is 
that resp has not stated a valid substantive due process 
violation. If that is accepted, then Ewing is left without a 
federal law claim, because his §1983 claim is premised on a 
violation of his substantive due process rights. His only 
remaining claims are that the University has failed to abide by 
its own rules or by state contract law. A claim seeking to force 
state officials to conform their conduct to the requirements of 
state law is foreclosed by Pennhurst. Thus, by accepting the 
SG's argument the Court can dispose of the case on the merits and 
deal with the Eleventh Amendment issue. 
The other possible approaches (such as the approach of 
the DC below) at least implicity admit that resp has stated a 
colorable federal claim. Once you admit that, then it is also 
logically necessary to admit that the case is barred by the 
Eleventh Amendment, since the federal claims seek retroactive 
relief. But it seems to me that the Court can conclude that no 
valid substantive due process claim has been stated without 
directly running afoul of the fact that the Court lacks 






TO: Mike FROM: Sept. 30, 1985 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
84-1273 Regents University of Michigan v. Ewing 
This refers to our brief discussion on Friday of 
the ef feet of the proposed amendment by the respondent 
medical student to his complaint. An amendment that 
simply changed the name of the defendant (petitioner) from 
the Board of Regents to the member of the Board acting in 
their "official capacities". My understanding is that 
precisely the same remedy is sought: the right to retake 
the examination - in effect an alleged "property right" in 
education provided by the state. 
Since our talk I have read Bill's bench memo in 
Green v. Mansour, 84-6270, an Eleventh Amendment case of 
some interest. Note p. 15 of Bill's memo in which he 
states: 
"Even though this is a suit against state 
officials and not the state itself, the Eleventh 
Amendment applies if the state is the real party 
in interest. Pennhurst, supra, at 908; Ford 
Motor Company v. Dept. of Treasury, 323 u.s. 
459, 464. 
• 
- - 2. 
This is my understanding of the law, but if I am 
correct you have a different view. You might take a look 
at Bill's memo and discuss this with him. 
missing something critical. 
lit lit lit 
I must be 
You might suggest a few questions for me to 
consider asking counsel at argument relating to whether 
the Eleventh Amendment can be evaded simply by suing 
individual state officials in their official capacity? 
This would apply 
motorist could 
to every s~ gency. 
claim af:_r,~ t 
I suppose a 
under the 
Cons ti tut ion to use all state roads, and could sue the 
members of the state highway department in their officials 
capacities for injuries sustained because of potholes. I 
mentioned bringing a suit against the members individually 
of a state's legislative body. Concededly examples are 
not easy to think of. Assume, as I believe is true in 
many states, that a judge may be impeached in proceedings 
somewhat similar to those provided for federal judges. 
Would a sitting judge impeached by the vote of a state 
senate be entitled to bring a federal court action, 
claiming a constitutional property right in his job, and 
naming as defendants members of the state senate acting in 
• 
- - 3. 
their official capacity. If such suits as these may be 
brought, there is not much left of the Eleventh Amendment. 
The foregoing suggests that I still probably do 
not understand distinctions that I am sure you have 
thought through. Nor have I read Patsy. In sum, let me 
have the benefit of your further thinking - in a brief 
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Copies to the Conference 
~ 
CHAMBERS O F 
JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
- -
~n;rrnnt <!fourt of tqt~tb ~tatts-
~ftinghrn. ~- <!f. 2llffe~~ 
November 15, 1985 
Re: 84-1273 - Regents of the 
University of Michigan v. Ewing 
Dear John, 
Please join me. 
Sin1,e:;ours, 
Justice Stevens 




JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
-
.invrtutt <qcurt ltf t4t ~itth .italt.tr 
Jht~ftmgton. ~- <If. 2.llffe'1-' / 
~ 
November 15, 1985 
9 
~ ~ 
4- . '~--t,, ,_ ~ 
/ 
Re: 84-1273 University of Michigan v. Ewing _50 Y'r:,,t.;J- f 
r'~~ Dear John, 
I have a few problems with the draft opinioy n 
in Ewing. I find most troubling the discussion on 
pages 11-14. At the outset, the draft appears to ~ 
adopt the Youngber~ v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982) 
standard and to reJect an arbitrary and capricious 
standard by quoting from Byron's dissent in Moore v. 
East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977). But it appears 
that the standard actually applied in the subsequent 
analysis is an "arbitrary and capricious" one. I am 
concerned that the application of this analysis may 
send the wrong signal to lower courts. 
Would it not be wiser to state simply that in 
view of the extensive procedural protections provided 
Ewing, the lack of any allegations of improper motive 
or bias, and the state of Ewing's record, the 
presumption of correctness accorded to professional 
decisionmaking prevails here? My fear is that despite 
all the cautionary language in the opinion, lower 
courts may construe the extended discussion of Ewing's 
academic performance and the possible reasons for his 
dismissal as a directive to conduct a more intrusive 
inquiry into the basis of the academic decision than 
is truly contemplated under the Youngberg standard. 
I also have difficulty with the discussion in 
footnote 5, as I am not at all sure that it is correct 
to take the Sixth Circuit to task for deciding the 
constitutional §1983 claim 'before the state law 
claims. As I understand your analysis, the state and 
federal claims may be treated as legally distinct: 
thus, deciding the state law claims first would not 
necessarily have obviated the need to reach the 
constitutional claim. Moreover, if the federal 
constitutional claim were denied initially, the 
federal court would then have been able to 
' I 
- - 2 - -
dismiss, without deciding, the pendent state claims. 
See United Mine workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 
(1966). It would seem that instead of breaching the 
Aswander principle, the court below may have chosen 
the correct method of attack. Would you be willing to 








.:hprmu arottrl of tlft ~b Jihdtg 
Jbtslfi:ttgton. J. ar. 21lffe'1, 
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN November 19, 1985 
Re: No. 84-1273, Regents of the University of 
Michigan v. Ewing 
Dear John: 
/ 
Please join me. I assume that you and Sandra can work 
out together the matters that are bothering her. 
Justice Stevens 
cc: The Conference 
Sincerely, 
-I?-
- -!\1tprnnt QJ4tltti of tlft ~tb .fhdt• 
-aslfinghnt. ~- <1t• 2llffe>l-.;l 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
November 19, 1985 
Re: No. 84-1273 University of Michigan v. Ewing 
Dear John, 
I pretty much agree with the observations made by 
Sandra in her letter of November 15th. I agree with most of 
your statements as to the law, but like her, I fear that 
lower courts when they see the detailed discussion of 
Ewing's academic career might conclude that if he had not 
been quite such a miserable candidate, the result would have 
come out differently. I am sure you don't intend this, but 
I think the extent of the discussion of the facts in the 




cc: The Conference 
- -
CHAMBERS OF' 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
.-upunu (lfltltri 41f tlft ~ttb --bdt• 
.... lfington. ~. cq. 211~,., 
November 19, 1985 
Re: 84-1273 - Regents of the University of 
Michigan v. Ewing 
Dear Sandra: 
Thank you for your letter. I believe the 
revised draft that I have just sent to the printer 
will satisfy your concerns. If not, please let me 
know. 
Respectfully, 
~ -l<- // 
Justice O'Connor 




JUSTI CE SAND R A DAY O'CONNOR 
-
~rtmt <qourt 1tf t4t )tnittb ~bdt»-
Jht.S'Ifington, ~. QI. 21lffe~~ 
November 20, 1985 
// 
Re: 84-1273 Regents of the University of Michigan 
v. Ewing_ 
Dear John, 
Please join me in your second draft which 
accommodates, at least partially, my concerns. 
I, for one, appreciate your efforts to indicate more 




Copies to the Conference 
- -
CHAMl!lERS Of" 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
.upi-tmt Otouri of tlrt ~b •tatt• 
'llu~ ,. Ot. 211.?,., 
/ 
November 20, 1985 
Re: No. 84-1273-Regents of University of Michigan v. 
Scott E. Ewing 
Dear John: 





cc: The Conference 
- -.fnprttnt (lfitttrl of tlf t ~tb .i\taus 
j}aslri:tt!Jbttt. ~- (If. 2llffe,., 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
November 25, 1985 
Re: No. 84-1273 Regents of the University of Michigan v. Ewing 
Dear John, 




cc: The Conference 
- • ,j1tprmu ~ltlUi of tlrt 1tnilth ~talts--.as Jrngbtn. ~. ar. 2llp~, 
CHAMl!IERS OF" 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
November 25, 1985 
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November 26 , 1985 
84-1273 Regents of University of Mi.chigan v. Ewing 
Dear John : 
I would like to join the second draft of your opin-
ion as I think it i.s excellent, but I do have two concern~. 
I would not assume there is a substantive due process claim, 
and I will concur separately to cepeat the view expressed at 
Conference . It seems to me the time has come for us to de-
cide the issue~that was avoidea ln Horowitz . I see no ba~ia 
for holding that a student has the substantive <lue process 
right asserted in this case . 
I write also a:iout anot1ier pcint . Inltially, this 
suit was against the Regents an a Board . Not !Jntil the pe-
tition for cert was qranted was the comolalnt amendea to 
join the Board members .indiviAually as ~Jefendants in their 
official capacities . The universit.y dta not r.>ppos~ the mo-
tion, and your opinion grants it. Sec footnote 6,. p. 7. 
This trouhleo me for two reasons . I tl-tink the 
precedent of granting an amendment to a complaint aft~r we 
have granted certiorari is one that m;iy plague us. More 
fundamentally, I am not persuad~".l that all Eleventh J\m~nd-
ment issues in this cas() can be circumvented merely !:>ya 
change in the description of the defendant. The relief 
sought can only be granted by the Board or an appropr 4ate 
committee acting pursuant to Board authority . Respondent in 
effect seeks relief against the state . In addition, the 
reliei sought is retroactive. Although respondent s~eks an 
injunction that would allow him to retake the NDf.1E, the true 
nature of his claim is a remedy for an alleged past viola-
tion of federal law. Resoonaent makes no valid argument 
that the violation is ongoing . •rhus, his claim falls some-
where in between Ex Parte Young and Edelman , closer, I think 
to Edelman . The problem is that this relief may b@ fore -
closed by the Eleventh Amendment . I do not think the Court 
has answered the question here presented in any prior case . 
On the facts of this case, we do not need to reach 
the issue because the Regents have waived their Eleventh 
Amendment defense . Your footnote 7 mentions this waiver 
with respect to the technical pleading issue , and concludes 
- -
2. 
that amendment of the pleadings cured "any potential Elev-
enth AJttendment problems." It would seem more appronriate to 
reserve judgment on the two Eleventh Amendm~nt problems in 
this case by expressly hasing footnote 7 on the Regents' 
waiver, and by stating th~t th~refore we do not reach the 
merits of the Eleventh l;\mendrnent issues. 
It ~eems inappropriate to decicl~ an issue that i 
not necessary to the decision of this case, and indeed has 
not been argued. I am afraid that your note 6, p. 7, will 
be read as such a decision. -
Justice Stevens 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conterenc 
Sincerely, 
